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This paper provides a comprehensive review of the five 
major theories of computer-mediated communication 
(CMC) in order to explore how each theory can illuminate 
the processes and effects of contemporary online incivility 
phenomena on bystanders. These theories include: social 
presence theory, reduced social cues perspective, social 
identity model of deindividuation effects, social 
information processing theory, and hyperpersonal model 
of CMC. Of these five, this paper gives the most discussion 
to the first three theories that offer relatively more useful 
explanations of uncivil and antisocial behaviors in CMC, 
in terms of contributions of limited nonverbal social cues, 
and then explicates them with respect to the dynamics of 
online bystanders witnessing those problematic behaviors. 
This paper also examines, albeit relatively briefly, why the 
other theories are less useful but still have potentials for 
researching online bystanders. Further considerations 
needed to develop each theory and future research are 
discussed in the conclusion. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Initial research on CMC was optimistic about its 
enhanced capabilities for “cool communication” [1], which 
could realize more efficient information exchange and 
equal participation by virtue of minimized interpersonal 
noise, compared to face-to-face (FTF) communication [2]. 
Before long, scholars increasingly discussed the limitations 
of CMC, noting its technologically induced anonymity and 
lack of nonverbal cues. Although some suggested that 
CMC facilitates moderate exchanges of socioemotional 
content [3], many concluded that it is devoid of the norms 
governing social interactions, which in turn triggers 
uninhibited and aggressive communication behavior [4]. 
Relatively recently, scholars have suggested that CMC 
establishes normative contexts that favor or disfavor such 
behavior and have weakened the dubious link between 
CMC and impersonal communication [5]. 
There are two general theoretical approaches 
summarizing this change of perspective on CMC. One 
approach (labeled as a cues-filtered-out approach) holds a 
technologically deterministic view, and is used by the 
social presence theory and reduced social cues perspective. 
The other approach holds a social-psychological oriented 
view, and is used by the social identity model of 
deindividuation effects (SIDE), social information 
processing theory (SIP), and hyperpersonal model of CMC. 
The former group of theories assumes that the specific 
features of digital communication technology in and of 
themselves are primarily responsible for any changes noted 
in CMC (vs. FTF) contexts. The latter group of theories 
stresses the interaction between technology and the user, 
focusing on how the characteristics of the communicator, 
their interactions with others, and contextual factors affect 
the perceived capacities of CMC systems. Thus, both 
approaches reflect competing theoretical paradigms about 
CMC and, in a broader sense, communication itself.  
Although readers may find these five theories reviewed 
in other sources, this paper focuses on describing how each 
theory can explain the dark side of CMC. This paper 
particularly tries to assess their status and prospect as a 
tool for studying online incivility––a manner of aggressive 
and disruptive online behavior that can range from 
uninhibited and incensed discussion, to hateful and 
outrageous speech, as well as more severe forms of 
harassment, such as purposeful embarrassment and 
physical threats––that has become the “new normal” in 
today’s CMC [6, 7]. In doing so, the focus is on the 
processes and effects of these antisocial behaviors towards 
observers, namely bystanders, who are expected to serve a 
role of either intervening against or reinforcing the 
problem. Although the five theories are considered mature 
because of their explanatory power and empirical validity, 
there have been no explicit theoretical positions upon 
which systematic investigations of online incivility 
bystanders can be undertaken. Moreover, prior discussions 
in this area have heavily focused on those who are directly 
involved––that is, uncivil perpetrators (bullies) and their 
targets (victims)––and thus have paid less attention to 
those who are indirectly affected yet make up the majority 
of the public (i.e., bystander public or bystander audience) 
[8]. To fill this gap, this paper sheds light on exposure-
related concerns (cf. perpetration) for online incivility and 
thereby highlights the complexity of tackling this issue. 
Evidence from the real world, however, suggests 
varying possibilities of using these CMC theories to 
explain the psychological and behavioral dynamics of 
online bystanders. For example, roughly one-quarter of 
Americans (28%) say they have adjusted their online 
presence by changing privacy settings or quitting an online 
service, after witnessing harassment [9]. These results can 





be examined through the lens of social presence theory. It 
is also a well-known fact that people are less likely to act 
on behalf of a target in need if they are part of a large 
crowd [10] or they perceive themselves to be invisible, 
compared to when they can discern one another in a group 
setting [11]. The reason why such impersonal behavior is 
common when bystanders are given limited information 
about the focal incident and those involved is possibly 
explained by the reduced social cues perspective. A report 
on the damaged mental wellbeing of young people who 
witness an attack on a group they belong to [12] reveals 
the importance of group identification between targets and 
bystanders, which is relevant to the SIDE approach. 
Moreover, given that online incivility is more vague than 
traditional forms of violence/bullying, bystanders have 
difficulty interpreting the situation and how to behave [13]. 
This raises the question of whether online bystanders have 
sufficient time and opportunities to gain the information 
needed to reduce uncertainty about the situation, 
equivalent to those that offline bystanders have. The SIP 
theory can guide such inquiry. Meanwhile, the fact that 
sixty-nine percent of Americans blame the Internet and 
social media for escalating the level of incivility in their 
country [14] suggests the potential amplifying role of 
CMC (vs. FTF) features on this problem, which can be 
studied using the hyperpersonal model of CMC.  
Taking all available evidence into account, this paper 
comprehensively reviews the applicability of each CMC 
theory for research of bystanders witnessing online 
incivility that occurs in individual, group, and crowd levels. 
Although the specific dynamics of bystander behavior may 
vary based on the particular behavior witnessed (e.g., 
cyberbullying, flaming, hate speech), this paper assumes 
that any form of uncivil CMC behavior is comparable 
since they similarly violate what is considered normative 
in human communication. Given that bystanders react to 
attacks on not only individual targets but also social 
groups/values [15], the particularities of different forms of 
online incivility may not fundamentally alter the moral and 
psychological mechanisms underlying bystander behavior. 
Although this paper does not test one specific theory 
against another, based on quantitative and systematic 
analyses, it contributes to the literature by revisiting the 
five CMC theories and assessing their further utility. Each 
section includes numerous research examples that can help 
us understand both the potentials and limitations each 
theory has when explaining the phenomenon in question. 
 
2. Social presence theory 
 
Social presence is defined as the subjective quality of a 
medium that determines the degree of salience of 
interactants and their interpersonal communication in that 
medium [16]. It relates to other social psychology concepts, 
such as intimacy [17] and immediacy [18], which indicate 
a function of proximity and psychological distance 
between interactants, and often refers to “the degree to 
which a person is perceived as a real person in mediated 
communication” [19, p. 10]. Researchers assume that 
decreased social presence in CMC can create more 
distance between communicators and lead them to 
perceive each other as “semi-mechanical objects which can 
be ignored, insulted, exploited, or hurt with relative 
impunity” [20, p. 972]. People may regard less than 
desirable behavior as acceptable when they consider others 
to be more machine-like, rather than real social beings [21].  
There has been general agreement that negative 
communicative behaviors (e.g., flaming, trolling, verbal 
aggression) occur with the diminished social presence 
conveyed in online environments. Due to weak reminders 
of the presence and proximity of conversation partners, 
people tend to focus on themselves more strongly than 
their audience [22], and, in turn, their deviant opinion and 
behavior could persist under low pressure to conform to 
social norms [23]. Supporting this, a classic study on 
Usenet, an early Internet newsgroup system, found that a 
large proportion of its users breached conventional 
communication etiquette when they forgot they were 
interacting with others and were not afraid of their verbal 
aggression being questioned [24]. Since then, researchers 
have examined the role of social presence in online 
disinhibition, which causes problematic use of social 
media [25] and its more toxic forms, such as expressions 
of hatred and use of violence/pornography sites [26].  
Research further suggests that the lack of social 
presence online may cause a focal incident to be 
misinterpreted by perpetrators and targets. For example, 
less prompt feedback about the incident makes it hard for 
the perpetrator to accurately assess the target’s distress and, 
thus, they feel less empathic [27]. Targets themselves may 
also have distorted perceptions depending on the degree of 
social presence. They may consider their victimization less 
severe than traditional violence/bullying when it occurs in 
an online setting with low social presence (e.g., email) [28]. 
Conversely, targets may feel more severely impacted in a 
high social presence context (e.g., picture/video clip) [29].  
The focus of research on social presence and antisocial 
CMC has been often directed towards the stances of 
perpetrators and targets. Less attention has been given to 
bystanders who are possibly affected by their experience 
of witnessing the same incident. These people observe 
interactions not only between the perpetrator and target but 
also between other bystanders, in order to interpret the 
given situation and determine their response. In this 
process, the lack of social presence online can mislead 
bystanders’ perceptions and result in inappropriate 
behaviors that may hamper the resolution of the situation. 
The bystander apathy effect (the idea that third-party 
witnesses of a critical incident have an opportunity to 
intervene but often do not do so when they are part of a 
group; [30]) suggests a more important implication of 
social presence for bystanders––a social inhibition effect 
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on intervention. Latané and Darley [31] revealed: when 
bystanders could (a) see and be seen, (b) see but not be 
seen, (c) not see but be seen, or (d) neither see nor be seen 
by the other bystanders, those who thought they were 
alone intervened the most, followed by those in the no-
perceived-presence condition and then those in the half-
presence conditions; but bystanders in the full-presence 
condition intervened the least. Some social psychological 
processes may drive these results [32], such as pluralistic 
ignorance (i.e., the perceived presence of passive 
bystanders misleads the individual to interpret the situation 
as less critical than it actually is) and the diffusion of 
responsibility (i.e., the psychological costs of  
nonintervention are shared with others who are co-present). 
Such an inhibitory role of the presence factor in 
bystander intervention hold for CMC as well. For example, 
it takes longer for an individual to receive help when the 
number of people present in an online group chat increases 
[33]. Also, people tend not to counterargue online uncivil 
speech when there is even the mere presence of prior 
reactions of any kind, compared to no reactions at all [34]. 
As such, if the perceived presence of others reduces a 
likelihood of intervention, this social inhibition effect may 
be pronounced in a high social presence context. But this 
reasoning is inconsistent with the basic premise of social 
presence theory, which equates increased social presence 
with increased positive outcomes. This theory assumes that 
individuals take on certain roles in social interactions—and 
believe others feel jointly responsible—to develop positive 
relations [16]. If so, a greater sense of others’ existence 
can enhance a greater feeling of belonging and, in turn, 
create positive social outcomes [25]. However, this 
possibility conflicts with the well-known tendency of 
bystanders to become inactive when they believe others 
are present and observing their behavior. 
In short, the existing social presence explanation in 
CMC research predicts that prosocial bystander behavior is 
less likely in a low social presence context, while the 
bystander apathy effect predicts the opposite. It thus seems 
paradoxical to juxtapose these competing views. However, 
in a broader sense, these two theories parallel each other 
because they are general theories that draw on the basic 
laws of human nature. Both cover multivariable processes 
that are common themes of social impact, which refers to 
“any of the great variety of changes in physiological states 
and subjective feelings, motives and emotions, cognitions 
and beliefs, values and behavior, that occur in an 
individual, human (or animal), as a result of the real, 
implied, or imagined presence or actions of other 
individuals” [35, p. 343]. In this sense, an integrated but 
flexible framework can be developed that encompasses the 
two theories’ competing predictions by providing a more 
effective explanation of the relationship between social 
presence and bystander behavior in online contexts. 
Technically speaking, CMC does not meet the 
originally proposed condition for the bystander apathy 
effect (i.e., the physical presence of others) although an 
imagined or presumed audience can be just as impactful as 
a real audience [36]. Hence, there may be a need for an 
alternative and more appropriate notion of “presence (of 
others)” when we approach online bystander dynamics. 
Social presence theory can offer useful insights in this 
respect, since it has addressed the “(mediated) presence” as 
a complex construct with several distinctive properties, 
including telepresence/spatial presence (a sense of being 
there in a virtual environment that creates illusion of place) 
[37] and copresence (a sense of being together in a virtual 
environment where individuals feel that others are 
accessible and available) [38]. Given that online people 
may have a unique presence that is defined not simply 
based on “here or not-here” but on a varying degree of 
self-controlled (in)visibility [39], we can speculate that 
online bystander behavior could be driven by the perceived 
copresence (cf. telepresence) of others. 
It is notable that social presence is not a binary 
construct (present vs. absent) but defined on a continuum 
of varying levels. This conceptualization aligns with 
Goffman’s understanding that copresence is grounded on 
the basic “sensory” awareness of others and spans a 
continuum from minimal to intense [40]. This is a good 
reflection of the uniqueness of CMC, where people have 
an extended sense of being connected to others and in 
control of their (in)visibility level through technologies 
[39]. The concept of copresence also includes mutual 
awareness (i.e., an individual is aware of the other and the 
other is aware of the self) [38] and the awareness of others’ 
reactions to the self [41]. It emphasizes psychological 
connections between interactants [42], beyond coexistence 
with one another, which may help explain the social 
psychological mechanisms underlying bystander behavior. 
In visually anonymous CMC, bystanders may misleadingly 
believe there are more people (virtually) present than is 
true, like the metaphor of a light bulb in an infinity mirror 
[35]. If so, the copresence of only a few online others can 
more readily incur the bystander apathy effect. 
Such inhibitory effects by the copresence factor may be 
more challenging with contemporary multimodal and 
interactive technologies, which are designed to magnify 
social presence experiences online. However, in the 
context of online incivility, increased social presence may 
not always be equated with good consequences; instead, 
less social presence (of the self and others) perceived by 
online bystanders may hamper the bystander apathy effect 
and encourage intervention by reducing their apprehension 
of evaluation by others [43]. Thus, how to adjust the level 
of social presence in CMC to ensure prosocial responses 
against online incivility is a tricky question that should be 
left to future researchers. 
 
3. Reduced social cues perspective 
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The reduced social cues perspective holds that CMC is 
inherently disadvantaged compared to FTF communication 
because electronic signals convey fewer nonverbal social 
cues that help efficiently communicate a message’s 
connotation and contextual information. Scholars of this 
perspective associate the technological aspects of CMC 
with its liberation potentials, which could increase equality 
of participation [44] and decrease status differentials [45], 
but also could yield risky group decisions [46]. These 
results are well illustrated in organizational CMC, where 
information exchanges through email (vs. FTF meeting) 
appear more often to be self-absorbed, uninhibited, and 
irresponsible [22]. This perspective suggests that when 
social cues, which signal the presence of others, are weak 
people might have less other-focused attention and 
perceive more privacy from surveillance. They might thus 
feel unrestrained in their communication and treat others in 
impulsive and hyper-responsive manners.  
The belief underlying this perspective is that CMC 
leads people to a state of deindividuation––a state of losing 
their inner constraints and, as a result, showing impulsive 
behavior that is normally considered inappropriate [47]. 
Much of the debate surrounds this question: under what 
conditions does deindividuation cause aggressive behavior 
in CMC. Researchers have often concluded that the 
reduced social cues in CMC––due to technologically-
induced anonymity and weak social feedback––decreased 
users’ self-awareness, as well as their awareness of others 
[48]. But some researchers have challenged this view by 
questioning if antisocial and aggressive behavior is an 
inevitable outcome of CMC [5], suggesting that its 
occurrence is socially and culturally dependent on the way 
people perceive group norms in a deindividuated state [49].  
The reduced social cues perspective highlights that 
CMC users may feel pressure to use any available means 
(even hostile language) to ensure they are being correctly 
understood in the absence of nonverbal cues and 
immediate feedback [50]. A study guided by this 
perspective reveals that people compose messages more 
aggressively when there are fewer social and visual cues 
present from others [26]. This tendency, coupled with the 
liberation potentials of anonymity, contributes to CMC’s 
evolution as a highly free and open atmosphere for public 
discussion online [51]. However, this kind of CMC 
conversation often turns into vicious debates marked by 
incivility [52], with fewer social cues about the perpetrator 
than in FTF ones. Bystanders, as receivers of the 
perpetrator’s message, may try to reduce their uncertainty 
of the incident, and, in doing so, their attention may be 
directed solely toward available verbal cues in the message. 
Such a narrow focus on the perpetrator’s message can 
act as an aggressive cue to elicit bystanders’ own hostile 
perceptions through cognitive and affective priming, 
according to the general aggression model [53]. This 
happens even among bystanders who are free from 
dispositional characteristics relevant to aggressive attitudes. 
Supporting this assumption, those exposed to uncivil user 
comments were found to experience hostile cognitions and 
emotions [54, 55] or report less open-mindedness about a 
discussed news issue [56]. Although such negative arousal 
may diminish after exposure, it can determine immediate 
behavior in response to the message. Exposure to uncivil 
discussions online could motivate bystanders to join the 
same discursive activities [57] through aggressive 
intentions [58] or defensive motivations [56]. If so, 
bystanders may be, correspondingly, more likely to act in 
ways that ease their distress by utilizing more assertive 
language and behavior, which seemingly results in 
externalizing the same problematic verbal behavior they 
witness. This may explain why being a bystander of online 
hate is positively related to being its perpetrator. This also 
hints at why this problem has become so prevalent [59]. 
Such a potential for bystanders to commit incivility can 
also be understood as a virtual form of behavioral 
synchrony (i.e., an instantaneous behavioral copying) and 
subsequent emotional convergence, namely emotional 
contagion [60]. Evidence that CMC users transfer their 
moods (both positive and negative) to others when there is 
a complete absence of nonverbal cues online [61] suggests 
that the amount of cues available is not necessarily a 
condition of emotional contagion. That is, the subtle 
adverse impact of online incivility exposure can occur to 
bystanders even in the cue-poor CMC setting. Exploring 
the possibility that bystanders themselves may engage in 
impersonal communication is another area that should be 
studied from the reduced social cues perspective. 
More research is still needed on whether a lack of 
nonverbal cues serves as an impediment or a contributor to 
bystander intervention. As bystander research suggests, 
intervention is less likely when bystanders are in a highly 
ambiguous situation [62] or when they only hear about a 
situation without any visual/auditory cues [63]. The same 
can apply to anonymous CMC settings where a message 
alone may not be enough to construe whether the incident 
is intervention appropriate. But it is hard to conclude that 
more cue-availability will always increase the likelihood of 
intervention, as mentioned in the previous section. Another 
question to be raised is what kind of cues matter to 
bystanders. Given that the medium of presentation does 
not always alter the perceived severity of uncivil speech 
[64], the amount of visual cues about the incident itself 
may not significantly affect bystanders. Rather, cues that 
indicate who is online and active may be more significant 
by signaling the presence of an imagined audience—
possibly causing the implicit bystander (apathy) effect [65]. 
 
4. Social identity model of deindividuation 
effects (SIDE) 
 
Along with a migration from the technologically 
deterministic view toward more consideration for social 
and group-level factors in CMC, the social identity model 
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of deindividuation effects (SIDE) has emerged as an 
alternative research paradigm [66]. This model still shares 
the basic premise of the cues-filtered-out perspective but 
instead highlights how visual anonymity obscures 
individuality of the self/others and causes people to orient 
themselves to a salient social category or group identity 
cues [49]. This explanation paradoxically suggests that the 
lack of interpersonal cues in CMC can lead subtle social 
context cues to take on a greater value and accentuate the 
salience of intergroup boundaries [67].  
The SIDE model offers social influence explanations 
for uninhibited and antisocial CMC behavior. It challenges 
the reduced social cues perspective that solely ascribes 
technical properties of the medium to negative behavior 
and does not specify the precise conditions under which 
the behavior does and does not occur [5]. Unlike the 
traditional approach that links anonymity to online 
aggression [e.g., 68], this model posits that uncivil 
behaviors can also occur in non-anonymous CMC [69] and 
that anonymity allows people to follow a salient standard 
for a situationally “acceptable” act, even though it is 
negative and antisocial, as far as it meets the prevailing 
norm in the given context [70]. This is supported by 
evidence that aggressive language in user comments 
increased under an aggressive social norm for commenting, 
and this effect became stronger with online anonymity [71]. 
Given that social category cues (cf. individuating cues) 
are usually conveyed in the form of discrete information 
that is not sensitive to the bandwidth of a communication 
channel [5], the SIDE model argues that people, in 
anonymous CMC, can identify others in terms of salient 
social dimensions. They can then decide their own 
behavior as well as evaluate others’ behaviors based on the 
ways they support in-group norms [72]. All these 
processes involving social categorization and group 
influence can help hypothesize group-based bystander 
dynamics. For instance, individual bystanders may respond 
differently to online incivility incidents depending on 
whether the group membership of the perpetrator, target, 
and other bystanders does or does not overlap with their 
own identity. Regarding an incident perpetrated by an in-
group member targeting an out-group member, bystanders 
may consider it legitimate and justified situationally, 
especially when there is high hostility against the out-
group. Conversely, it is likely that bystanders may 
intervene against the in-group member’s uncivil behavior 
if it is perceived as breaching their in-group norm (i.e., 
black sheep effects) [73]. In this case, in-group deviants 
may be assessed based on their personal faults rather than 
their group-based attributes. As such, bystanders may 
show in-group favoritism toward desirable deviants but in-
group derogation toward undesirable deviants, both of 
whom are, defined by the specific context. 
The same in-group biases may also occur in the 
bystander-target relation. Given that belonging to a 
common group can facilitate prosocial behavior, especially 
when their in-group is under threat, bystanders may more 
willingly intervene for in-group (vs. out-group) targets 
[74]. In contrast, in-group derogation, or the black sheep 
effect, may occur when bystanders feel more desire to 
keep themselves from feeling shame and want to ensure a 
positive social identity for the whole group by separating 
the undesirable targets from good representatives [75]. If 
this is the case, the target’s distress may be attributed to 
their own personality weakness or social ineptitude. This 
possibility may contribute to why racist messages towards 
an individual are sometimes evaluated as less harmful by 
in-group bystanders, rather than out-group bystanders [64]. 
Relations among bystanders matter as well. In fact, a 
potent factor driving intervention may lie in the degree of 
we-ness a bystander shares with fellow bystanders. 
Traditional bystander research showed that perceived 
similarity [76] or cohesiveness [77] within a bystander 
group could reverse the bystander apathy effect, revealing 
in-group biases around intervention. But according to a 
study on a Facebook group’s intervention movement 
against online incivility [78], a shared social identity was 
not enough to elicit people’s engagement. Instead, this 
study suggested that other group-level variables (e.g., 
group efficacy, group rule) should be considered when 
understanding collective action by online bystanders. 
Taking these ideas together, the SIDE model’s social 
influence explanation can be tailored for bystanders. That 
is, if a negative CMC behavior depends on the perceived 
group norm of that behavior, such normative influences 
can reach beyond perpetrators to include even those who 
observe the behavior. The model suggests that bystanders 
determine their behavior in response to group norms 
generated by in-group members’ salient responses, since 
people primed with a certain behavior are more likely to 
comply to the prime-consistent norm [79]. One thing to 
note is that such a group norm has emergent and 
situational properties that arise from negotiated agreements 
among those involved in the particular context [80]. This 
implies that bystander intervention may not occur when no 
stable norms sanction such behavior. The current public 
commonly regards flaming or swearing as acceptable in 
online discussions because they are not considered a 
violation of negative expectancy [81]. 
As society has become tolerant of online incivility, 
bystander intervention may be more unlikely. Moreover, 
with increasingly intense social polarization, bystanders 
may consider any negative behavior directed against out-
groups to be justifiable. If this is coupled with frequent 
encounters with in-group perpetrators, bystanders may 
become desensitized to and less inhibited by further hate 
speech [64]. This is exacerbated by not only descriptive 
norms (“what the majority does”) but also injunctive 
norms (“what the majority approves”); that is, bystanders 
will more likely assimilate online incivility when it is 
perceived to be prevalent as well as socially approved. 
This is in line with earlier evidence that the Usenet group’s 
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tradition of verbal aggression was reinforced by new users 
mimicking “acceptable” behavior from existing users and 
socializing themselves to act similarly [24]. The same is 
also seen in today’s adolescents who learn online hate to 
get approval from their peers [59]. 
 
5. Social information processing theory 
 
The social information processing theory (SIP) [82] 
has been put forward to reveal the underestimated 
potentials of CMC. This theory criticizes the past approach 
of comparing CMC and FTF communication, which was 
confined to one-shot or an initial stage of interactions 
among unacquainted people. The theory argues that 
relational development in CMC should be examined based 
on ongoing interactions because it involves asynchronous 
interactions that require more time for the same amount of 
social information to accrue. If this temporal asymmetry is 
compensated, by allowing sufficient time and message 
exchanges, this theory believes people can develop 
relationships online that are as complete as those 
developed offline. Evidence supports this belief. For 
example, longitudinal CMC groups showed an increase in 
positive relational outcomes compared to FTF groups [83].  
In this way, the SIP theory weakens the previous 
conclusion that CMC is inferior to FTF communication. 
However, the theory focuses primarily on socially oriented 
communication rather than antisocial communication. In 
one study that applied this theory to uninhibited negative 
verbal behavior (i.e., flaming), the expected moderating 
role of a time factor was not found [84]; that is, the amount 
of flaming within CMC was not different between time-
limited and unlimited interactions, and the gap between 
CMC and FTF groups did not vary when the interaction 
was restricted. This finding suggests that the effects of 
ample time and messages might not be found in negative 
relational contexts of CMC, which needs more research. 
One of the basic beliefs underlying the SIP theory is 
that interpersonal relationships become less strained as 
they develop over time [85]. However, this may not be true 
for online incivility situations where one cannot easily 
alter an unfavorable impression formed at the initial stage 
of interaction. As the general aggression model argues, 
even a single exposure to a hostile message can elicit a 
relatively high level of negative arousal, which may not 
dissipate as easily as positive or neutral arousals. 
Triggering hostile cognitions can occur not only for targets 
but also bystanders [55]. If more time and more messages 
are allowed to make this kind of situation repeatedly and 
continuously occur, the rehearsal of aggressive cognition 
and affection may aggravate the problem. This may 
continue until negative arousal relaxes with accrued 
knowledge and reduced uncertainty about the perpetrator. 
Meanwhile, although not specifically motivated by 
relational purposes, bystanders are likely to interact with 
fellow bystanders who may have common motivators—
such as wanting to resolve the ambiguity of a situation or 
establish an appropriate context for their response of any 
kind. According to the SIP theory, if more time or message 
exchanges are allowed, bystanders may more likely engage 
in deliberate decision-making processes for intervention 
[86], based on accrued information from others.  
But traditional bystander research suggests the opposite, 
clashing with the SIP theory’s proposition. For example, 
Latane´ and Nida [32] posited requisite communication 
conditions for the bystander apathy effect to occur. They 
found that the overall intervention rate was higher when the 
communication opportunity among bystanders was restricted, 
rather than when full communication was possible. This led 
to a counter-intuitive conclusion about the importance of 
communication possibilities among bystanders. For 
instance, more communication among bystanders could 
decrease their prosocial behavior, as opposed to the SIP 
theory’s prediction. Due to such conflicting premises with 
the bystander theory and a paucity of relevant research, the 
SIP theory, at least for now, seems less than satisfactory as a 
general explanation framework for online bystander behavior. 
 
6. Hyperpersonal model of CMC 
 
The hyperpersonal model of CMC [87] aligns with the 
SIP theory since it also argues that CMC users make the 
most of cues available to form impressions and develop 
relationships. But this model goes further to explain how 
they can achieve such outcomes that surpass the level of 
affection and intimacy experienced by FTF interactants. 
Namely, hyperpersonal effects can be generated through a 
combination of four different, but related, elements of the 
communication process: selective self-presentation of the 
sender, over-attribution by the receiver, asynchronicity of 
the channel, and intensification of the feedback loop. 
These elements operate jointly to foster mediated social 
relationships that can exceed FTF relationships. 
Evidence supports this view, showing that CMC users 
overcome limitations in the medium to accomplish a given 
task by compensating for the lack of nonverbal cues. 
Specifically, the users tend to employ a greater proportion 
of more direct strategies for uncertainty reduction (e.g., 
self-disclosure, in-depth question) and in turn gain greater 
confidence in predicting their partner’s behavior than FTF 
interactants [88]. Furthermore, those who interact in long-
term CMC report the most positive partner evaluations, 
compared to those in short-term CMC and those who 
switch from CMC to FTF communication [89], suggesting 
a maximized likelihood of hyperpersonal effects over time. 
The hyperpersonal model argues that CMC allows 
people to exploit opportunities to “facilitate desired 
relationships” and “enhance relational outcomes” that 
exceed those in FTF communication, through the 
overaccommodation process that appears even when 
people interact with less desirable partners [90]. Some 
researchers explored the possibility of the hyperpersonal 
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effects that might occur in negative CMC situations [e.g., 
91]. They found that the anonymous and asynchronous 
nature of CMC might allow perpetrators (senders) to hide 
their identity and avoid immediate feedback. Targets 
(receivers) might then interpret the perpetrator’s message 
in various ways, due to the absence of nonverbal cues, 
often overdramatizing the severity of the incident. As such, 
CMC settings can be more suited than FTF settings for 
perpetrators to achieve their aims to “facilitate desired 
relationships” (dominant-submissive relationship) and 
“enhance relational outcomes” (threat to the target). 
Such negative hyperpersonal effects may underlie what 
is happening in the current online incivility phenomena, 
where CMC interactions promote hatred and harm that 
surpasses the level of those in FTF interactions. In effect, 
the hyperpersonal perspective may be more adequate for 
explaining perpetrator-target interactions, since it mainly 
focuses on the processes of message formulation and 
reception between the sender and receiver; it does not 
include the processes of evaluation or intervention by a 
third party, like bystanders. Nevertheless, one possible 
way to apply this model to bystander research is to situate 
bystanders also as receivers who read all messages 
generated during a developing incident. 
The hyperpersonal model can allow scholars to 
entertain some possible scenarios for how online 
bystanders make causal inferences about the incident and 
decide their response. For instance, bystanders may regard 
the perpetrator’s message as a kind of self-expression, such 
as intentionally unfavorable self-disclosure through 
destructive behavior [92]. If so, bystanders may 
exaggeratedly evaluate the perpetrator’s antisocial traits 
and think it is more reasonable to support the target over 
the perpetrator [32]. The same negative over-attribution 
can also occur with respect to the target’s message. If the 
target overshares personal information online—often 
indicative of increased vulnerability to cyberbullying 
[93]—bystanders may instead overestimate the target’s 
undesirable traits and blame them. 
Some possible explanations can also be derived from 
this model to elucidate differences between online and 
offline bystanders. If the anonymous and asynchronous 
channels of CMC serve to reduce evaluation apprehension 
that bystanders may have in FTF settings, they may be 
more likely to act for themselves online under less pressure 
from immediate social inhibitions [94]. Meanwhile, some 
scholars have extended the hyperpersonal model, 
suggesting that the sender’s self-presentation might affect 
not only impression formation by the receiver but also self-
perception by the sender themself (i.e., identity shift; [95]). 
From this, we can speculate why cyberbullying bystanders 
reported changes in their personality (e.g., reduced 
empathy) after remaining passive for a long time [96]. As 
such, a self-expression effect can occur for bystanders 






This paper weighed the usefulness of the core theories 
of CMC for studying how bystanders are influenced by, or 
influence, today’s online incivility problems. The social 
presence theory and reduced social cues perspective, 
enables us to predict that CMC may shift bystanders’ 
attention away from the social context of an incident, 
instead making them more responsive to immediate verbal 
cues from an aggressive message. Such exposure may 
arouse hostile cognitions, by leading bystanders to behave 
in more impulsive and assertive manners, which suggests 
the emotional contagion effect. Regarding bystander 
intervention, competing possibilities can be entertained 
with the varying availability of cues. If a lack of social 
feedback online makes it difficult to construe an incident, 
such ambiguity may hamper intervention. But it is also 
hard to expect that intervention will be encouraged even if 
more social/visual cues are given, because an increase in 
the perceived social presence of others can exert inhibition 
effects on individual bystanders. The SIDE model can 
offer alternative accounts that better fit the classic notion 
of a bystander being sensitive to social contexts. This 
model can help existing bystander research move beyond 
the analyses of intraindividual/interpersonal processes. In 
doing so, it can further uncover how online incivility 
becomes tolerated, even normalized, by increased numbers 
of bystanders conforming to group norms. Applications of 
the SIP theory and hyperpersonal model of CMC, due to 
their concern with relatively long-term and sender-
receiver-focused interactions, may not nicely fit research 
on short-term exposure experiences of online bystanders. 
There is a need for further research to enrich these two 
theories to encompass current uncivil behaviors online. 
While assessing each theory’s assumptions about the 
prosocial and antisocial potentials of CMC, this paper also 
reached the conclusion that the original premises 
prompting these theories may need reexamination in light 
of new and ever-changing digital communication 
technologies. For example, the traditional cues-filtered-out 
perspective, which emerged based on text-only CMC 
settings, may not satisfactorily explain the dynamics in 
today’s cue-rich online platforms. Another example is the 
SIDE model, which may also not fit every CMC context, 
particularly where short-lived and low-affinity interactions 
(or even one-off and instantaneous postings) occur and 
thus are not met with consequential social identification 
processes. In the same vein, explanations from the SIP 
theory and hyperpersonal model, which tend to conceive 
continuous and ongoing relationships, may be of limited 
value. These limitations call for more concerted scholarly 
inquiry into the reappraisal of CMC theories. 
 
7.2. Future research directions 
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More fruitful discussions can take place by considering 
how future efforts should be directed to advance existing 
CMC theories for online bystander research. The current 
paper reveals that some theories––more precisely, the 
bounded set of assumptions within each––may conflict 
with each other. For example, regarding the effect of visual 
anonymity, the cues-filtered-out perspective predicts 
decreased group conformity among bystanders while the 
SIDE model predicts the opposite. Such incompatibility 
between the theories shows the complexity of the 
phenomenon but also opens new avenues for more robust 
theoretical deliberation. Future research should seek to 
explain how different CMC theories complement each 
other, given that the dynamics of online bystanders can be 
better understood with additional insights, which cannot 
otherwise be obtained from the individual theories. 
Inevitably, this paper must discuss how each theory can 
and should be extended to enhance its explanatory power 
on current online incivility phenomena. A straightforward 
but challenging way would be to revise each theory by 
adding new auxiliary hypotheses; however, this attempt 
may enlarge or diminish their relative scope.  
The cues-filtered-out group of theories (social presence 
theory and reduced social cues perspective) needs to seek a 
possible explanation for why today’s CMC, despite its 
greatly increased availability of nonverbal cues, still leads 
users to engage in self-focused, affectively negative, and 
impersonal communication. The scope of this explanation 
should be extended to include implications for message 
receivers (both targets and non-targets), instead of merely 
message senders, which have long been the focus of these 
early theories. In doing so, the theories should 
accommodate up-to-date evidence from contemporary 
multimodal and interactive technologies, such as video 
conferencing and augmented reality (AR). Those 
technologies can amplify the capabilities of online 
bystanders to perceive the virtual co-presence of others, be 
connected to each other, and adjust their (in)visibility. 
For the SIDE model, which emphasizes group-level 
processes and intergroup relations, a question that has to 
be discussed in depth is how this model can apply into the 
context of large-scale online interactions, especially on 
open-access, crowd platforms that often serve as vigorous, 
violent places of public engagement (e.g., Twitter feeds, 
Reddit threads). In this communication setting, inter-
individual-based impressions (cf. inter-group-based 
impressions) may take precedence during the initial 
impression formation unless members of online groups 
develop cohesion. The model needs to explain the 
processes of how such platforms provoke SIDE dynamics 
among bystander groups, especially in response to online 
hate incidents involving social identity (e.g., race, gender).  
The SIP theory and hyperpersonal model, despite their 
relatively limited usefulness, can be further developed by 
incorporating recent evidence of negative online behaviors. 
The advanced features of digital communication channels 
and emergence of new CMC language enable people to 
more rapidly and readily accrue impressions of and 
relations with others online. In response to these empirical 
challenges and technological developments, these two 
theories should attempt to explain the mechanisms of how 
such changes contribute to antisocial CMC patterns and 
amplify such negative effects to a level that exceeds those 
observed in FTF settings. This is a big challenge but also a 
significant opportunity, both in light of renewed tests of 
their validity and extensions of their explanatory power. 
Along with the effort to improve individual theories, 
another challenge is how to deal with discussions 
comparing CMC and FTF communication––a common 
agenda of the theories––that are increasingly 
inconsequential today since digital technologies are 
thoroughly embedded in all aspects of everyday life. Given 
that CMC research, which initially held a dichotomous 
view (non-mediated versus mediated communication), is 
gradually having its boundaries blurred, it may be 
inevitable that these five theories need to reestablish their 
perspectives. It should be noted that, in the early literature 
on this comparative approach, discussions were mostly 
centered on whether and how (the then devalued) CMC 
parallels FTF communication in terms of prosocial and 
affiliative behavior. Attention can be, and should be, 
shifted to draw a parallel between the two in terms of 
antisocial behavior. This comparative approach can still be 
applied to future research on how and why today’s CMC 
escalates risk and danger arising from online incivility 
situations that parallel, or even exceed, offline situations.  
Extending concern with the FTF vs. CMC comparison, 
attention should be given to the possible interplay between 
online and offline interactions where bystanders witness 
the same uncivil incident in both contexts simultaneously. 
Evidence indicates that bystanders retained their roles 
across these contexts, but this was particularly true of 
those in an outsider role; conversely, other bystander roles 
(defender, reinforcer, assistant) were inconsistent between 
offline and online bullying situations [97]. That is, the 
overlap between offline and online bystander behavior 
might be accounted for mainly by inactive bystanders, 
rather than active bystanders. This gap can be explained by 
the particularities of CMC itself. But an important 
unknown to test is whether the psychological mechanisms 
underlying bystander behavior are fundamentally altered 
depending on the context. To determine this, future 
research should uncover bystanders’ different decision-
making processes in CMC and FTF situations, by 
exploring new factors affecting intervention, such as time 
constraints [98] or online/offline social bonds [99]. 
Beyond the theoretical discussions, future work should 
move to the next phase, where researchers would make 
more explicit connections between the theoretical 
frameworks and practices. As mentioned in the 
introduction, evidence from the real world suggests new 
possibilities for CMC theories to explain what is 
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challenging today’s online bystanders and why that matters. 
The resulting findings are significant for practitioners 
coping with online incivility, because they can offer 
practical tips for designing platforms in a way that does 
not interrupt bystander intervention. For example, digital 
platforms need more careful consideration when 
displaying the kinds and amounts of “cues” generated by 
their systems and users, in order to prevent the bystander 
apathy effect or induce the non-negative bystander effect 
(i.e., the role of fellow bystanders to influence a bystander 
to become prosocial; [100]). The advancement of CMC 
theories, suggested in this paper, can inform a variety of 
influential moderators of these effects, which should be 
investigated to help optimize the chances that platform 
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